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INTRODUCTION 
One can no longer speak meaningfully about national law without speaking of law in its 
transnational context. Transnational legal ordering now spans public regulatory law, private 
business law, and human rights law. These transnationally-shaped legal domains interact. For 
example, at the international level, one cannot speak meaningfully about the international law and 
politics of trade and intellectual property (IP) law under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
without considering other transnational legal norms, such as economic and social rights. The issues 
that these legal domains cover intersect across levels of social organization, from national legal 
systems to international regimes.  
This chapter proceeds in five parts. Part I examines the complications of normatively 
assessing intellectual property protection in light of tradeoffs involving multiple goals, including 
knowledge creation, trade governance, economic development, and public health. Part II discusses 
the development and interaction of different transnational legal orders (TLOs), by which we refer 
to legal orders that go all the way down from international law to national law and local legal 
practice, and that interact recursively in both bottom-up and top-down ways.2 Different 
transnational legal orders reflect diverse, and potentially conflicting, values and priorities that 
affect national law and practice. The ensuing sections address the tensions between a TLO that 
prioritizes trade and intellectual property protection, and one that foregrounds human rights values, 
including public health. Part III presents the rise of the TLO for intellectual property, and the 
struggles that continue to shape it. Part IV examines the rise of an overlapping and rival TLO based 
on the human right to health. This emergent TLO directly challenges some of the central tenets of 
the trade and intellectual property TLO. Suddenly states are pushing back and forth over what they 
had appeared to have “settled” multilaterally under the TRIPS Agreement. Competing values that 
once traveled along separate but parallel tracks are now intersecting and directly clashing, forcing 
hard policy choices.  Part V concludes with strategies that developing countries can adopt, and 
have adopted, to address the challenges of implementing these two transnational legal orders to 
advance their development goals, including access to medicines.  
1 Gregory Shaffer is Melvin C. Steen Professor, University of Minnesota Law School, and Affiliated Professor of 
Political Science, University of Minnesota; Susan Sell is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at 
George Washington University. We wish to thank participants at conferences in Bologna, Italy and at FLACSO in 
Buenos Aires, for their comments. We wish to thank Julia Norsetter for her valuable research assistance. 
2 For two broader projects on transnational legal ordering and transnational legal orders respectively, see 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., forthcoming 2013); Gregory Shaffer, 
Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE 
(Gregory Shaffer ed., 2013) [hereinafter Shaffer, Transnational]. 
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I. NORMATIVELY EVALUATING IP PROTECTION  
From a normative perspective, there is no singular optimal level of intellectual property 
protection either globally or nationally. Without transnational legal ordering, the level that a nation 
chooses will vary based on the values and priorities that it seeks to advance. In part, these choices 
will reflect its level of development and its comparative advantage in innovation and imitation. 
Different forms of intellectual property protection are important for the creation and diffusion of 
knowledge for economic development. Yet the proper level of intellectual property protection is 
an extremely difficult and contested empirical question.3  Too little protection can undercut 
incentives for creative and innovative activity, and thus result in a reduction of social welfare. Too 
much protection can obstruct innovation and raise costs for consumers. Thus too much protection 
may reduce both the production of knowledge and the ability of the public to use it. Intellectual 
property protection may jeopardize the pursuit of other social goals as well, such as access to 
medicines. Policy makers must navigate this tension and balance the different policy goals that 
reflect divergent values and priorities. In short, determining the appropriate scope and level of IP 
protection raises both empirical issues and value choices. 
The debates over pharmaceutical patent protection and the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) raise at least five potentially competing 
normative priorities with profound distributive implications. These are: monopoly incentives to 
induce innovation; free trade; economic development, public health; and the right to life and 
human dignity.4 We discuss each in turn.  
Knowledge has some public goods attributes. Once knowledge enters the public domain it 
is no longer excludable, and one’s consumption of it does not diminish its availability. And yet, 
among the main challenges that intellectual property policy confronts is how to generate this 
knowledge, both efficiently and equitably. States have granted temporary monopoly privileges 
such as patents in order to provide incentives to innovate. The offering of such legal protection 
removes knowledge from the public domain for a defined time period.5   
A legal order of liberalized trade also provides benefits. While it is true that liberalized 
trade produces both winners and losers and may give rise to distributional conflicts, one can make 
a normative case that trade liberalization results in a wider variety of products being made available 
at lower prices. Liberalized trade rewards efficient production and exchange. A liberal trade legal 
order also helps to provide predictability to encourage long-term investment and increased 
productivity. It further helps countries to avoid the kind of tit-for-tat protectionist measures that 
gave rise to the drastic reduction in global trade during the 1930s and had devastating economic 
and political consequences. A stable and predictable legal order of liberalized trade can help 
countries avoid the temptation of engaging in trade discrimination during financial crises.6  
3 See, e.g., KEITH MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000). 
4 For an exploration of this issue in the context of WTO dispute settlement, see Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public 
Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 459 (2004).  
5 Knowledge can be subject to some excludability, as through trade secrets, so that it is not a pure public good. See, 
e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 306–25 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc Stern eds., 1999) [hereinafter 
GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS] (labelling knowledge an “impure public good”).  
6 See, e.g., Nancy Birdsall & Robert Lawrence, Deep Integration and Trade Agreements: Good for Developing 
Countries, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 5, at 128, 133.  
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A legal order can also prioritize economic development goals in which poorer countries 
may “free ride” on the innovations of others, benefitting from imitating their products and making 
them available for their citizens at reduced prices. Imitation and reverse engineering are core 
mechanisms of this strategy.7 Through this process, these countries can develop new industries 
that eventually can become competitive innovators, as happened with Japan and Korea, and now 
appears to be occurring with China. At a later time, these countries may switch their policies 
toward granting greater intellectual property protection to further innovation. 
Public health has been viewed as a public good since all individuals benefit from the global 
curtailment and eradication of diseases and they do not diminish that good when they benefit from 
it.8 Incentives for innovation, such as patents, can contribute to the development of drugs and 
treatments to combat disease. Although ideally everyone could benefit equally from effective 
advances in medicine, in practice these goods have not been equally available to everyone, in large 
part because of their cost.  
Finally from a human rights perspective, the availability of disease-eradicating medicines 
can be viewed as an integral component of the human right to life and dignity. The normative 
priority of the human right to life and dignity can compete or conflict with other important values. 
In particular, sharp tensions between human rights and property rights produce political, social, 
and economic controversies over pharmaceutical patent protection, as well as issues regarding the 
funding of medicines compared to other policy initiatives in a world of scarcity. “Rights” language, 
whether applied to human rights or property rights, implies a sense of entitlement in which the 
right trumps other policy goals in terms of hierarchy.  
The recognition and enforcement of patent rights under TRIPS and other IP treaties can 
generate incentives for the production of knowledge and new drugs for public health and the 
protection of human life. But the HIV/AIDS pandemic underscored how the protection of 
pharmaceutical patent rights may also undermine the benefits of liberalized trade by restricting 
consumer access through monopoly pricing power and staving off generic drug competition. These 
policies can reduce public health options for containing diseases, and raise human rights concerns 
insofar as lack of access leads to unnecessary and preventable deaths.  
Societies inevitably must make choices among conflicting normative priorities.9 The key 
institutional question is: who decides the appropriate balancing among policy goals?10 Choices 
between liberalized trade, patent protection, economic development, public health, and human 
rights reflect different values, priorities, perspectives, and generate considerable uncertainty. 
Policymakers must make institutional choices despite these tradeoffs. The rise of different 
transnational legal orders in different substantive domains help frame approaches to these 
normative and institutional questions. 
  
II. THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS  
7 SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST (1998).  
8 See, e.g., Todd Sandler & Daniel G. Arce, A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Global and Transnational 
Goods for Health, 23 FISCAL STUD. 195 (2002). 
9 See Gregory Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World, EUROPEAN J. INT’L 
L., Vol. 31, No. 3, 669 (2012). 




                                                 
Social orders increasingly are legalized transnationally, reflecting processes of economic 
and cultural globalization.11 As a result, issues that formerly were viewed as national in scope have 
been transformed to have transnational (and sometimes global) dimensions.12 Whether the social 
order concerns protections for intellectual property rights or public health, removal of barriers to 
trade or observance of human rights, the ordering of responses to these issues inside the state and 
across national frontiers increasingly involves legal norms that transcend national boundaries. We 
can define a transnational legal order (TLO) as a collection of formalized legal norms and 
associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order behavior that spans national 
jurisdictions.13 
The concept of the creation of TLOs addresses the social and political construction of 
problems and their resolution. The construction of a problem is not a “natural” one, but involves 
actors with particular perceptions, including of their own interests, which advance particular 
imaginings of solutions to the problem to create a new order. They increasingly do so by working 
to create and institutionalize a legal order that is transnational in scope. Different transnational 
legal orders emerge that vary in terms of geographic scope and legal scope. TLOs can vary 
geographically, ranging from bilateral, regional, plurilateral, multilateral, to global agreements. 
Such range is illustrated by law applying to the European Union, to North America under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to parts of South America under the Andean Pact, to 
countries spanning the Pacific under the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, to 
countries spanning the globe under the WTO and the United Nations (UN). They also vary by 
substantive legal focus, such as over trade, investment, finance, environmental protection, 
intellectually property, public health, and human rights. These TLOs, of varying legal and 
geographic scope operate simultaneously, sometimes incognizant of each other, sometimes in 
competition with each other, and sometimes in antagonistic interaction with each other. They can 
thus be seen as varying along two dimensions: (1) the degree of settlement of the transnational 
legal norms, and (2) the extent of issue alignment among existing TLOs.14 
 The politics of international trade and IP law in relation to pharmaceutical patents 
increasingly involves the interaction of such transnational legal orders. In particular, it involves 
the interaction of TLOs focused on trade and intellectual property protection, and TLOs focused 
on human rights. These transnational legal orders involve recursive interaction between 
transnational legal norm-making and national implementation. They may feature conflicts among 
TLOs not only transnationally but also within nation states.  
The issue of access to medicines, in particular, has been characterized by a high degree of 
contestation and a significant lack of alignment among international institutions over the last 
decade. The result has been significant tension among TLOs that previously were distinct and 
segregated, those of IP, trade, and the human right to health. As Laurence Helfer shows, one can 
see the interaction of these TLOs in terms of three time periods. In the first period, the TLOs were 
separate, did not interact, and their norms were relatively open-ended and unsettled transnationally. 
In the second period, an IP-trade TLO became predominant and its norms appeared to be relatively 
11 See Shaffer, Transnational, supra note 2. 
12 Shaffer, supra note 9. 
13 “Associated organizations and actors” is construed broadly to include any organization or social formation, 
including networks, and actors may refer both to collective actors and to individuals whose activities and careers 
cross national boundaries. See TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 2; Shaffer, Transnational, supra note 2.  
14 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 2.  
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settled transnationally. In the third period, the IP TLO on pharmaceutical patents became unsettled 
in light of developments in a parallel TLO on the economic and social right to health care.15 
Before the mid-1990s, the IP and economic and social rights TLOs were entirely distinct 
and relatively unsettled. Under the IP TLO, there was considerable debate within the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as to what form of special and differential treatment 
should be applied to developing countries, and there were few substantive requirements for patents 
other than application of non-discrimination norms. Similarly, under the UN International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the scope of an economic and social 
right to health was contested among states and civil society actors. Yet, although there was 
contestation within these TLOs, there was no interaction between them. States were thus largely 
unconstrained in adapting the IP and right to health legal norms that they desired, including 
regarding access to medicines. 
From the mid-1990s until around 2000, in light of the incorporation of IP into the WTO 
package of agreements, and the negotiation of new bilateral and plurilateral agreements containing 
TRIPS-plus provisions,16 countries around the world adopted new IP laws, including for the 
patenting of pharmaceutical products. There appeared to be settlement as to the applicable legal 
norms in this domain, which many observers and civil society actors decried. As a result, countries 
were considerably more constrained in providing inexpensive drugs to patients pursuant to a right 
to health.  
Since around 2000, a new transnational legal order for the economic and social right of 
access to medicines has become institutionalized. It has done so as a result of a number of factors, 
and in particular the resistance of states, non-state actors, and international human rights and health 
organizations to the IP TLO. The salience of the AIDS epidemic where improved access to 
medicines could save millions of lives helped to precipitate the emergence of this rival TLO. 
Powerful business interests supported by their home states nonetheless continued to push for 
greater IP protection, including through bilateral and plurilateral agreements, leading to 
considerable normative dissensus and contestation, as well as competing constraints for 
developing countries from these rival transnational legal orders.  
 
III. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE TLO FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Law is often viewed as producing social order out of conflict. But in studying law, we also 
need to assess how law reflects power. Law, in this sense, is Janus-faced, involving both the 
creation of normative order and the reflection of power. Legal realist scholars have long noted this 
aspect of law, but it has often been elided in legal scholarship.17 As the political scientist Michael 
Barnett writes:  
 
Power and legitimacy [such as legal legitimacy] . . .  are not conflicting concepts 
but rather are complementary ones. The powerful, too, want their actions to be 
15 See Laurence Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health: The Contested Evolution of the 
Transnational Legal Order on Access to Medicines, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 2. See also 
LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE 
GLOBAL INTERFACE (2011). 
16 “TRIPS-plus” refers to requirements that exceed the minimum standards mandated by TRIPS. 
17 See Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, U. TORONTO L.J., Vol. 57, No. 3, 607 (2007); Victoria Nourse 
& Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 62 (2009). 
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viewed as legitimate, if only to maintain their power and further their interests. 
Even the powerful, in this view, cannot act in an expedient and narrowly self-
interested manner and must observe international society's underlying rules and 
norms.18  
 
The United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU) use a variety of means to shape IP 
rules transnationally. They use the carrot of granting access to their valuable markets, and the stick 
of threatening to withdraw such access, in order to pressure countries to raise IP standards. They 
have the material resources to engage in negotiations in multiple fora to advance their interests, 
and are the protagonists in creating institutions that shape and constrain what can be discussed 
within them. They have the knowledge resources to shape understandings, including through the 
provision of technical assistance and capacity building which frame issues in particular ways. For 
example, representatives of pharmaceutical trade associations work with U.S. and EU officials to 
draft “model” laws and to teach as “faculty” in workshops organized by WIPO on intellectual 
property law and its enforcement.19  
The very concept of “intellectual property” is a social and political construction. 
Alternative organizing concepts could be used and institutionalized through law, such as “access 
to knowledge,” or “knowledge for development,” but the concept of “intellectual property” has 
been globalized. The concept is, for example, at odds with many traditional and indigenous 
approaches to knowledge and ideas, and countries have varied over time in the extent of intellectual 
property protection available in light of their stage of development.  The original signatories to the 
Berne and Paris Conventions, respectively, for patent and copyright protection were primarily 
developed countries.20  Over time, countries have adopted IP laws that mirrored those of the former 
colonizer, or tailored IP laws to reflect perceptions of domestic interests.21  For example, a number 
of developing countries would not issue patents on pharmaceutical products and agricultural 
chemicals.22  In fact, before 1970, the United States was among a small minority of countries that 
offered patents on pharmaceutical products.23   
Much has been written about the strategies of the powerful that led to the creation of the 
TRIPS Agreement.24 In a strategic move, the United States integrated IP into trade policies during 
18 Michael N. Barnett, Bringing in the New World Order: Liberalism, Legitimacy, and the United Nations, 49 
WORLD POL. 526, 544 (1997). 
19 See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2009). 
20 Brazil, Ecuador, and El Salvador, and Guatemala, for example, were the only developing country signatories to 
the 1883 International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property Paris Convention (the Paris Convention). 
Id. at 37.  
21 See Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of Developing Country 
Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 316, 326–37 (2011); DEERE, 
supra note 19, at 37–38 (contrasting Latin American adaptation of IP rules for national purposes with African 
countries copying the laws of the colonial metropole).  
22 By the 1970s, India’s patent laws allowed patents on the methods and processes related to medicines, but not on 
the medicines themselves.  Brazil did not permit patents on pharmaceutical processes and products from 1971 to 
1996. DEERE, supra note 19, at 40. 
23 Id. 
24 See, e.g., PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY? (2003) [hereinafter INFORMATION FEUDALISM]; CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN SELL, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY (Lynne Rienner ed., 2005); SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003).  
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the 1980s, using the threat of withdrawing market access to constrain the ability of developing 
countries to resist demands for greater IP protection. The U.S. used, and continues to use, its 
Special 301 procedure under which countries are placed on watch lists of varying priority 
regarding their IP protections.25 From 1985-1995, at least eighteen countries reformed national 
laws to strengthen patent protection due to other measures by the U.S. and EU.26 Working closely 
with private trade associations, these strategies eventually facilitated the inclusion of the TRIPS 
Agreement as part of the WTO’s single package of agreements.27 A country could not benefit from 
WTO market access opportunities unless it also agreed to be bound by the TRIPS Agreement’s IP 
requirements.  
 
A. The TRIPS Agreement and its Flexibilities 
The TRIPS Agreement set forth unprecedented strong mandatory, minimum standards of   
IP rules, and applied them to countries regardless of level of development, although with different 
deadlines for implementation which have been extended for least developed countries.28 The 
Agreement obliges WTO members to implement these minimum standards for most categories of 
IP.  For patents, it requires protection for all fields of technology for a minimum of twenty years.29 
It also requires states to ensure that private IP rights holders can take “effective action” against IP 
infringement, and help enforce IP rights through border measures and criminal law.30 The liberal 
trade economist Jagdish Bhagwati thus writes that the TRIPS Agreement “positions the WTO 
primarily as a collector of intellectual property-related rents on behalf of multinational 
corporations.”31 The financial burden of the agreement’s implementation and enforcement is 
considerable. World Bank economists have estimated that the agreement has cost less developed 
countries $60 billion a year.32         
25 Office of the United States Trade Representative, April 1, 2013. “2012 Special 301 Report,” 
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2012 Special 301 Report_0.pdf.  
26 A number of US and EU domestic laws allowed for the coercion of developing countries.  The Generalized 
System of Preferences Renewal Act (1984), for example, authorized the US president to withdraw tariff concessions 
from developing countries with weak IP protection.  At the time, 140 countries received US GSP benefits. 
DRAHOS with BRAITHWAITE, at 88.  
27 World Trade Organization, 1994. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
www.wto.org/emglish/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm  
28 Deadlines for implementation are varied and have been revised; developing countries were granted a five-year 
transition period until January 2000.  Least-developed countries were initially expected to implement TRIPS by 
2006, a deadline which was later extended to 2013 after requesting an extension.  See DEERE, supra note 19, at 67–
69 tbl.3.1.  Negotiations for a further extension for the LDCs are currently underway. William New, ip-watch, May 
24, 2013, “At WTO, LDC fight for extension of TRIPS transition continues,” www.ip-watch.org/2013/05/24/ldc-
fight-for extension-of-trips-transition-continues/   
29 The 1883 International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (the Paris Convention) is silent on the 
question of patent duration. DEERE, supra note 19, at 66. 
30 World Trade Organization, TRIPS, Article 41. 
31 Jagdish Bhagwati, What It Will Take to Get Developing Countries into a New Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL., 
http://www.iatp.org/files/What_It_Will_Take_to_Get_Developing_Countries_.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
32 See J. Michael Finger, Introduction and Overview, in POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004).  See also WORLD BANK, 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 136 (2002) (“Bangladesh anticipated one-time 
costs of administrative TRIPS compliance (drafting legislation) amounting to $250,000, and over $1.1 million in 
annual costs for judicial work, equipment, and enforcement efforts.”).  
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Paradoxically, although the TRIPS Agreement imposes significant obligations on states to 
protect the holders of IP rights, commentators now commonly refer to the flexibilities in its 
provisions to counter U.S. and EU demands for ever greater IP requirements. Although the most 
stringent at the time it was signed, the TRIPS Agreement provides for interpretive options, such 
as what constitutes novelty and an inventive step for purposes of granting a patent. Among the 
most important of the exceptions for patents for developing countries are: the right of parallel 
importation; the right to grant compulsory licenses; and ‘Bolar’ exceptions for generic drug 
companies to prepare a drug under patent for marketing authorization once the patent expires.33  
The TRIPS Agreement restricts the use of compulsory licensing to certain specified 
conditions, and in particular for predominant use for only the domestic market.34 The explosion of 
the AIDS crisis and international protests against the effect of pharmaceutical patents on public 
health placed pressure on the WTO to facilitate the use of compulsory licenses and other TRIPS 
“flexibilities.” In 2001, WTO members negotiated the Doha Declaration on Public Health35 and 
they adopted a waiver in August 2003 that enables any member country to import pharmaceutical 
products under a compulsory license (although the conditions of the waiver are still contested for 
being too stringent).36 This decision could assist those developing countries that lack the domestic 
manufacturing capacity to produce pharmaceuticals themselves under a compulsory license. A 
number of developing countries have since issued compulsory licenses, mostly related to public 
33 WTO, TRIPS, Articles 6, 8.1, 8.2, 30, and 31. Carlos Correa, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS 
INTO PATENT LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, (The South Center: Geneva, 2000), pp. 70-77; 
93-100. Available at: apps.who.int/medicine docs/pdf.h2963e/h2963e.pdf 
34 Article 6 of the 2001 Doha Declaration underlined the fact that TRIPS Article 31(f) might limit the ability of 
countries with insufficient manufacturing capabilities to import cheaper generics, as the products manufactured 
under compulsory licenses must be “predominantly” for the domestic market.  World Trade Organization, DOHA 
DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2. 14 
November 2001 available at: www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/tripshealth.pdf. v See also Carlos M. Correa, 
Public Health and Patent Legislation in Developing Countries, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 45–47 (2001).  
35 DOHA DECLARATION. 
36 This waiver is subject to the terms of the “30 August Decision.” See DEERE, supra note 19, at 82. Additionally, on 
December 6, 2005, the General Council adopted a decision to amend TRIPS in an attempt to solve problems posed 
by Article 31(f); however, the amendment will not become part of the Agreement until two thirds of WTO Members 
ratify it.  See Press Release, World Trade Org., Members OK Amendment to Make Health Flexibility Permanent 
(Dec. 6, 2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e. The original deadline was 
December 2007, which was later extended to December 2009, and then to December 2011.  See Amendment of the 
TRIPS Agreement: Decision of 6 December 2005, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Dec. 8, 2005), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm;  Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement – Extension of the 
Period for the Acceptance by Members of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement: Decision of 18 December 
2007, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Dec. 21, 2007), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wt-l-711_e.pdf; 
Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement – Second Extension of the Period for the Acceptance by Members of the 
Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement: Decision of 17 December 2009, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Dec. 18, 2009), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wt-l-785_e.pdf.  As of December 2011, forty one countries had ratified 
the amendment. See WTO Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last updated Nov. 5, 2012).  “Countries wanting to 
import under the ‘paragraph 6’ system to have to notify the WTO in two ways. They have to announce once that 
they intend to make use of the system, and then they have to supply information each time they use it.”  See 
Notifications by importing WTO Members, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_import_e.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) (listing 
Rwanda as a state that has imported pursuant to paragraph 6). 
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health or government use.37 Perhaps even more importantly, some larger developing countries 
have used the threat of compulsory licenses to gain leverage in negotiation with patent holders to 
lower prices.38 
The ‘Bolar’ exception (named after the U.S. Roche v. Bolar case) permits generic drug 
producers to make use of patented materials during the patent term for the purpose of acquiring 
marketing approval and obtaining registration of a generic version of a branded drug. This 
exception helps to expedite bringing generic versions to market upon expiration of the patent.39 
Because it facilitates a more rapid entry of lower cost generic drugs, the Bolar exception can lower 
prices for both government health agencies and individual consumers. A WTO panel in the 
Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products case interpreted Article 30 of the TRIPs 
Agreement to permit such exceptions.40 Developing countries, however, so far have not widely 
adopted Bolar-type exceptions, particularly because many lack a generic industry. A 2006 survey 
of 106 developing countries showed that less than 10 had adopted explicit Bolar-type provisions.41  
In contrast, a much greater number of developing countries have permitted parallel imports 
of pharmaceutical products. Pharmaceutical companies provide opportunities for parallel imports 
whenever they practice price discrimination across diverse markets. A patent holder may charge 
“x” for a drug in one territorial market, and “x+100” for that same drug in another territorial 
market. Parallel importing provides a country with the opportunity to import a drug from the 
territorial market that offers the “x” price, rather than the “x+100” price, thereby containing costs. 
Such practices create an incentive for developing countries to import patented products from 
lower-priced markets. A 2006 sample of fifty-four developing countries showed that thirty-three 
permitted parallel imports. The countries varied, however, as to whether they recognized 
“exhaustion” of intellectual property rights upon first sale in the world or only in a region.42 TRIPs 
Article 6 permits countries to choose their preferred exhaustion system. Under a national or 
domestic exhaustion regime, when an IPR owner sells a good in a foreign market, she retains her 
right to prevent that genuine good from entering the domestic market where the IP right has not 
been “exhausted.”. In other words, she has a right to prevent parallel importation. Generally, 
37 These countries include: Brazil, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Malaysia (three times), Mozambique, Rwanda, 
Swaziland, Taiwan, Thailand (four times), Zambia, and Zimbabwe. DEERE, supra note 19, at 83. Importantly, 
developed countries have also referenced government use as a basis to interfere with patent rights for public health 
purposes.  See Jerome H. Reichman with Catherine Hasenzahl, “Non-voluntary licensing of patented inventions: 
Historical perspective, legal framework under TRIPS, and an overview of the practice in Canada and the USA”, 
Issue Paper 5, June 2003: ICSTD/UNCTAD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development. Available at: 
ictsd.net/downloads/2008/06/cs_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf 
38 See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the 
Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 
951 (2007) (“[T]he Brazilian government has used the threat of compulsory licenses to pressure foreign 
multinational patent holders to significantly lower the prices charged for [antiretroviral treatments]”).  
39 See generally, DEERE, supra note 19, at 81.  See also, Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-
First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1138 (2009) (describing a 
Chinese Bolar exception “which permits generic producers to reverse-engineer patented medicines to conduct 
clinical trials prior to the expiration of the patent”).   
40 See Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products: Report of the Panel, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 17, 
2000), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf; see also DEERE, supra note 19, at 81. 
41 DEERE, supra note 19, at 79–81. For example, “Argentina’s patent law states that any third party may use a 
product or process protected by patent prior to its expiration ‘to obtain the information required for the approval of a 
product or process by the competent authority so that it may be marketed following the patent expiration.” Id.  
42 DEERE, supra note 19, at 75.  
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international exhaustion regimes, in contrast to national ones, should expand access to medicines 
at a lower price because they facilitate parallel importation and deny the patent holder the right to 
block such imports because a first sale of the good anywhere in the world exhausts the domestic 
IP right.43    
 
B. The Proliferation of Bilateral and Plurilateral Agreements after TRIPS 
For leading industrialized countries such as the United States, the TRIPS Agreement 
represented only a foundation on which further IP protection could be built. They considered the 
TRIPS standards to be a floor, constituting absolute minimum standards, whereas many 
developing countries considered them to be a ceiling above which they would not have to go. At 
the conclusion of the TRIPS negotiations, a leading U.S. advocate proclaimed that, “we got 95% 
of what we wanted.”44  
In subsequent developments, the 5% that TRIPS proponents failed to achieve has 
prominently featured in U.S. and EU bilateral and plurilateral agreements. These agreements  have 
eliminated many of the flexibilities provided in the TRIPS Agreement.45  For example, many of 
them prohibit the practice of parallel importation of cheaper patented drugs and restrict the 
conditions under which countries may issue compulsory licenses. These provisions are examples 
of the exact features that U.S.- and OECD-based pharmaceutical firms sought, but failed to obtain, 
in the TRIPS negotiations. These new agreements are invariably TRIPS-plus agreements, because 
they expand requirements from the base that the TRIPS Agreement set, and TRIPS-minus 
agreements, in that they eliminate many TRIPS flexibilities.46 As a result, these bilateral, regional, 
and plurilateral IP agreements reduce access to lower cost products and may jeopardize generic 
competition. 
With respect to essential medicines, TRIPS-minus provisions limit a number of pertinent 
flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement, such as parallel importation, and compulsory licenses. 
To restrict parallel importation, TRIPs-minus provisions may provide the patent owner with an 
exclusive right to prohibit parallel importing contractually, thus curtailing a country’s ability to 
access more affordable patented drugs,47 as under the U.S. FTAs with Australia, Morocco and 
Singapore.48 The granting of compulsory licenses may be limited to narrowly specified conditions, 
43 Carsten Fink, Comment: Competition Law as a Means of Containing Intellectual Property Rights, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REGIME 771 (Keith Maskus & Jerome Reichman eds., 2005).  
44 SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 48 
(2003). 
45 Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Form Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, AND TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
447, 448 (2011).  Deere discusses a number of other tools used to push developing countries to implement stronger 
IP protection, including bilateral investment treaties, Special 301 threats, diplomatic threats, and industry pressure, 
such as direct lobbying by the pharmaceutical sector in developing countries.  See DEERE, supra note 19, at 154–64. 
The WTO website indicates that, “[a]s of 15 November 2011, some 505 RTAs (counting goods and services 
notifications separately) have been notified to the GATT/WTO.” Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG.,  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
46 See, e.g., Sell, supra note 40, at 448. 
47 Id. at 453–54. 
48 See DEERE, supra note 19, at 338–40 (listing the US FTAs with Singapore, Morocco, and Australia as containing 




                                                 
considerably more restrictive than under the TRIPs Agreement.49  The U.S. FTAs with Australia, 
Jordan, Singapore and Vietnam, for example, contain provisions that limit compulsory licenses to 
situations such as national emergencies, public non-commercial use, and as an antitrust remedy.50    
The TRIPS-plus provisions include expanded data-exclusivity requirements, patent linkage 
for marketing approvals, and lengthier patent terms.51 Some FTAs have included more stringent 
data-exclusivity requirements designed to force generic manufacturers to generate their own test 
data, as opposed to being able to rely on the findings of the brand name companies.52 The aim is 
to further delay generic competition and thus prolong the payment of higher prices to U.S. and EU 
rights holders. The U.S. has FTAs with provisions that expand test data protection for 
pharmaceutical products with at least thirteen developing countries, including Vietnam, Jordan, 
Chile, Singapore, Morocco, Australia, Bahrain, and the countries of the Dominican Republic-
Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA): that is, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.53 These data exclusivity 
provisions significantly extend TRIPs Article 39.3, which requires WTO members to protect 
undisclosed test data against unfair competition.54 
Many FTAs also require that the registration of medicines by health authorities be linked 
to patent protection. As a consequence, governmental authorities cannot register a drug that 
remains under patent protection. The treaties require regulatory authorities to notify the patent 
holder if a generic competitor attempts to register a generic version of a drug. This enrolls 
regulatory authorities into the patent enforcement process, mimicking the U.S. Hatch-Waxman 
regime. Free Trade Agreements that contain provisions prohibiting marketing approval of a 
generic drug during the patent term, unless authorized by the patent owner, include the U.S. FTAs 
with Singapore, Chile, Morocco, Australia, Bahrain, and the countries of the DR-CAFTA.55  
In combination, many U.S. FTAs prohibit generic producers from challenging a patent 
until after it has been granted. U.S. proposals for the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations would 
49 Sell discusses the detrimental effect of the interplay between TRIPS-Plus provisions.  For example, the ability of a 
state to issue compulsory licenses is affected by data exclusivity provisions and drug registration/patent linkage 
provisions. As a result, “prospective licensees are unlikely to replicate test data, and government cannot normally 
wait until a new set of test data has been developed.” Sell, supra note 40, at 454.  
50 See DEERE, supra note 19, at 338–40.   
51 See Carlos M. Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Access to Medicines, 84 BULL. WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. 399, 401 (2006); see also Sell, supra note 40, at 452–55. 
52 For example TRIPS-Plus data exclusivity requirements are included in U.S. FTAs with Morocco, Bahrain, 
Singapore, Australia, and DR-CAFTA. See Carsten Fink and Patrick Reichenmiller, “Tightening TRIPS: Intellectual 
Property Provisions of U.S. Free Trade Agreements”, Richard Newfarmer, ed., TRADE, DOHA, and 
DEVELOPMENT: A WINDOW INTO THE ISSUES (The World Bank: Washington D.C., 2006): 291.   
53 See DEERE, supra note 19, at 338–40; Sell, supra note 40, at 453.  
54 See Sell, supra note 40, at 453. 
55 See DEERE, supra note 19, at 338–40. TRIPS-Plus U.S. FTAs include: The United States – Chile Free Trade 
Agreement, www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text; The United States – 
Singapore Free Trade Agreement, www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text; The United States – 
Morocco Free Trade Agreement, www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/morocco-fta/final text; The United States - 
Australia Free Trade Agreement, www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/australia-fta/final-text; The United States – 
Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bahrain-fta/final-text; the Dominican Republic – 




                                                 
expressly forbid pre-grant opposition.56 Pre-grant opposition provisions in national laws permit 
generic producers to contest the patent application as it is filed. Without pre-grant opposition, 
generic producers wishing to challenge the validity of a drug patent have to wait until the patent 
has been granted and may have to engage in a costly and time-consuming judicial process. These 
provisions thus effectively block a generic company from obtaining marketing authorization from 
health authorities during the period that a patent is contested, again creating delays for generic 
companies and stalling competition..57  
In addition, a number of FTAs expand the patent term to make up for delays in the 
application process. They thus may significantly extend the 20-year period of patent protection 
provided under the TRIPs Agreement. The US. has FTAs with Vietnam, Jordan, Singapore, Chile, 
Morocco, Australia, Bahrain, and the DR-CAFTA which all contain provisions that provide patent 
term extensions for delays caused by regulatory approval processes.58   
The bilateral TRIPS-plus agreements are complemented by a unique “certification” process 
pursuant to which the U.S. Executive must certify to the U.S. Congress that the foreign country 
has modified its laws in compliance with the agreement in order for the agreement to take effect.59 
This certification process, in practice, requires the foreign country to show its draft legislation to 
the U.S. executive and receive its approval. The U.S. typically demands changes in such 
legislation, triggering a new, one-sided negotiation over that country’s implementing legislation. 
The aim of the U.S. executive is, once more, to reduce any flexible interpretations of the 
agreement’s requirements. In contrast, and asymmetrically, under U.S. law, the bilateral agreement 
will have no effect if it conflicts with any existing or subsequent U.S. law.60  
These TRIPS-plus agreements are part of a U.S. strategy to divide developing countries. 
Those countries that have already increased IP protections under an FTA with the U.S. have 
nothing to lose from their being multilateralized (and perhaps much to gain as other developing 
countries and their constituencies will then have to pay increased royalties and license fees to U.S. 
companies as well). Over time, as developing country holdouts become isolated, a tipping point 
could be reached through which the more stringent legal requirements become multilateralized.61  
The U.S. so far has been unsuccessful in negotiating enhanced patent protections in 
multilateral fora since the TRIPs Agreement. Thus the U.S. has pursued not only bilateral FTAs, 
but also plurilateral agreements. In particular, it initially failed in its efforts to negotiate a 
56 Draft: Trans-Pacific Partnership—Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Feb. 10, 
2011), http://www.keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf. For discussion, see Sean 
Flynn, Brook Baker, Margot Kaminski & Jimmy Koo, The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 106 (2012).   
57 See DEERE, supra note 19, at 338.    
58 See id. at 338–40; see also Correa, supra note 46, at 401.  
59 For example, the U.S. Congress passed an implementation bill in the United States –Central American-Dominican 
Republic Free Trade Agreement that requires the President to certify that the signatories have complied with the 
FTA provisions before its entry into force. Dominican Republic-Central American- United States Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act, Publ. L. 109-53, 109th Cong., 1st sess. (2005), Section 101, “Approval and Entry 
into Force of the Agreement”; see also: ”Bush secures CAFTA vote in last hours with renewed textile pledge”, 
Inside U.S. Trade July 29 (2005), (World Trade Online). 
60 Frederick Abbott, “Intellectual Property Provisions of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements in Light of U.S. 
Federal Law”, UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 12, February 2006; 
available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1912621 , 3-5. 
61 Peter Drahos, Bits and Bips, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001). 
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Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) under the auspices of WIPO.62 The U.S. then led efforts 
with Japan to strengthen IP enforcement through a new Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), which the USTR calls “the highest-standard plurilateral agreement ever achieved 
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights.”63  Signed by eight countries on 
October 1, 2011,64 non-signatories may be affected since the U.S. undoubtedly will press for 
countries to adopt its provisions as a condition for new FTAs.65  Indeed, the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) maintains that “it looks forward to partnering with developing 
countries through ACTA, and cooperating with ACTA partners to provide technical assistance to 
developing countries.”66  
Many commentators have noted the unbalanced nature of ACTA, finding that it favors 
rights-holders.67 Unlike the WTO Doha negotiating text68 and the WIPO Development Agenda,69 
ACTA includes no development dimension. It lacks language concerning limitations and 
exceptions for fair use of copyrights, and early drafts of ACTA would have endorsed in-transit 
seizures of generic drugs70 It creates a new ACTA Committee to oversee IP enforcement under its 
terms. The U.S. now views ACTA as the new (raised) floor for IP enforcement.  
ACTA constitutes a “club” agreement in which only industrialized countries interested in 
strong IP protection were invited to participate.71 Argentina, Brazil, India and China were thus 
62 See, e.g., Sell, supra note 40, at 455 (“In intellectual property norm setting, developing countries successfully 
rebuffed the U.S. and European efforts to pursue a TRIPS-plus Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) at WIPO.”). 
After painstaking negotiations to resume formal discussion, in late 2010 the Standing Committee on the Law of 
Patents agreed to begin work on multilateral agreements on exceptions and limitations and patent quality. William 
New and Kaitlin Mara, “WIPO Returns to Substantive Patent Law Talks after 5 years with Balance”, Intellectual 
Property Watch, 10/16/2010. Available at: http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/10/16/wipo-returns-to-substantive-patent-
law-talks-after -5-years-with-balance/print; Kimberlee Weatherall, “Three Lessons from ACTA and it Political 
Aftermath”, 35 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 575 (2012). 
63 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2013).   
64 The signatories were the U.S., Australia, Canada, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Morocco, and Singapore. Id.   
65 Sell, supra note 40, at 456 (“Inevitably, TRIPS-plus ACTA provisions will reappear in bilateral and regional trade 
agreements going forward in an effort to raise global standards of protection.”). 
66 Trade Facts: Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Aug. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2008/asset_upload_file760_15084.pdf.  
67 See Sell, supra note 40, at 457; Sean Flynn, “Learning from ACTA: Toward a Positive Agenda for TPP”, (March 
3, 2012). Available at: http://www.infojustice.org/archives/8650 ; Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the 
Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 385, 394–95 (2011); J. Janewa 
Oseitutu, “Value Divergence in Global Intellectual Property Law”, 87 Ind. L.J., 1639, 1667-69 (2012); Andrew 
Rens, “Enforcement Theater: The Enforcement Agenda and the Institutionalization of Enforcement Theater in the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement”, 35 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 553, 556 (2012). 
68 WT/MIN (05)/DEC 22 December 2005 “Doha Work Programme Ministerial Declaration (adopted 12/18/2005) 
available at: www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.htm  
69 WIPO Doc. A/43/16 Annex A. (September 2007) 
70 Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 385, 394–95 (2011) (“The only time ACTA mentions limitations or exceptions is in its discussion of 
technological circumvention measures, stating that “appropriate” limitations or exceptions may be maintained or 
adopted by parties in providing for remedies for the circumvention of technological measures.”); Weatherall, 2012, 
577.  
71 Daniel Gervais, “International Decision”, 103 Am. J. Int’l L. 549, 555 (2009); Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its 
Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (Nov. 2011); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 
513 (2011). On club goods see Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC 
GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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excluded. The draft texts were also kept from the public so that there was less opportunity to shape 
debates. The final agreement, moreover, was not even being presented to the U.S. Congress for 
ratification, but rather went into effect as a so-called sole “Executive Agreement” on the grounds 
that it is a trade agreement, and not an IP agreement.72 However, it is a trade agreement in name 
only, and not in substance.73 Had it been negotiated as an IP agreement under WIPO’s auspices, 
the treaty would have had to be presented to the Senate requiring a 2/3rds supra-majority approval 
under the Treaty presentment clause of the U.S. constitution. The future of ACTA, nonetheless, 
remains uncertain after the European Parliament overwhelmingly voted against it. Hundreds of 
thousands of Europeans took to the streets to protest ACTA in February 2012 and the European 
Union has suspended ratification.74 
The U.S. is now actively negotiating to join another plurilateral agreement, the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement. Leaked negotiating texts indicate that the U.S. aims to 
introduce more TRIPs-Plus provisions.75 In these negotiations, the U.S. now looks to ACTA and 
the 2011 U.S.-Korea FTA as providing the new “gold standard” for IP protection and 
enforcement.76 In sum, industrialized countries continue to work with the pharmaceutical and 
entertainment industries to build an enhanced IP transnational legal order. 
 
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF A COUNTERVAILING TLO FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS 
Implementing the TRIPs Agreement has been more of a challenge than the U.S. and Europe 
initially contemplated.77 It has been so, in large part, because a countervailing process of 
transnational legal ordering has emerged with a different normative frame, one with a human rights 
focus.78 Developing countries, non-state actors, and UN-based organizations have advanced this 
frame at the international and national levels both to counter the push for ever stronger IP 
protections, and to spur recognition and application of a right to health in public policy more 
generally. As the right to health becomes institutionalized nationally and transnationally, it too can 
be viewed as a TLO.  It interacts with and rivals the TLO for IP protection when the two overlap 
in addressing an issue, such as access to life-saving medicines. 
At the international level, developing countries have found support from the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Assembly, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCHR), the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Health, and the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS. The WHO Constitution establishes that 
72 Jack Goldsmith & Lawrence Lessig, Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement Raises Constitutional Concerns, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/25/AR2010032502403.html 
(discussing the Obama administration’s assertion that ACTA will be adopted as a sole executive agreement).  
73 Sell, supra note 40, at 456 (noting ACTA is an IP treaty, a fact counterintuitive in light of its name). 
74 Sean Flynn, Learning from ACTA: Toward a Positive Agenda for TPP, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Mar. 3, 2012), 
http://www.infojustice.org/archives/8650; Susan K. Sell, Revenge of the “Nerds”: Collective Action Against 
Intellectual Property Maximalism in the Global Information Age, INT’L STUDIES REV., Vol. 15, No. 1 (2013). 
75 For a detailed analysis, see Flynn, Baker, Kaminski & Koo, supra note 50. 
76 U.S. TPP IPR Proposal Offers Middle Ground Between ‘May 10’ Korea FTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Oct. 27, 2011), 
http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-10/28/2011/us-tpp-ipr-proposal-offers-middle-ground-
between-may-10-korea-fta/menu-id-710.html.   
77 See, e.g., Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, supra note 63 (discussing the particular difficulty TRIPS enforcement 
provisions have posed). 
78 See Lisa Forman, “Rights” and Wrongs: What Utility for the Right to Health in Reforming Trade Rules on 
Medicines?, 10 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 37 (2008); Helfer, supra note 15. 
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“the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of 
every human being.”79 The right to health also is incorporated in multiple human rights 
instruments, including the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and the United Nations Human Rights 
Council.80 The UNHCHR identified access to essential medicines as “a vital component of 
fulfilling the right to health.”81 The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) include access to 
essential medicines; the MDG Gap Task Force Report 2012 advised that “developing countries 
should carefully assess possible adverse impacts on access to medicines when adopting Trips-Plus 
provisions.”82  
Such rights advocacy helped to build alternative normative framings and pressure for the 
amendment and interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement in light of social welfare concerns, as 
reflected in the negotiation of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health in 2001. Egypt, 
Brazil, and Argentina, supported in parallel by powerful campaigns by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), proposed and succeeded in establishing the WIPO Development Agenda.83 
The WIPO Development Agenda has been viewed as “a call for restraint on the part of developed 
countries in their crusade for ever-stronger IP protection.”84 After six years of debate, WIPO 
adopted a series of recommendations related to the Development Agenda in 2007, and temporarily 
suspended negotiations for a new Substantive Patent Law Treaty that industrialized countries had 
promoted.85  Even though critics contend that WIPO remains part of a transnational legal culture 
focused on IP protection as defined predominantly by industrialized country legal systems, 
WIPO’s Development Agenda reflects a move to a more development-friendly approach to IP, 
endorsing access to technology and benefit-sharing.86   
Institutionalizing the human right to health has gained momentum at the regional and 
national levels as well. Laurence Helfer and Karen Alter have analyzed the Andean Community’s 
successful regional pro-access to medicines decisions in the Andean Tribunal.87 They demonstrate 
79 WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG. & WORLD TRADE ORG., PROMOTING ACCESS TO 
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION: INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND TRADE 40 (2013) [hereinafter PROMOTING ACCESS] (quoting the Constitution of the WHO). 
80 Id. at 40–41. 
81 Id. at 42. 
82 Id. at 43. 
83 DEERE, supra note 19, at 128.  WIPO Doc. A/43/16 Annex A. (September 2007) 
84 DEERE, supra note 19, at 128.  On various ways to frame an understanding of the WIPO Development Agenda, 
see Neil Netanel, ed. THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2009).,   
85 Id. at 132.  However, as of this writing, negotiations on a Substantive Patent Law Treaty have been renewed by 
WIPO. William New and Kaitlin Mara, “WIPO Returns to Substantive Patent Law Talks after 5 years with 
Balance”, Intellectual Property Watch, 10/16/2010. Available at: http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/10/16/wipo-returns-
to-substantive-patent-law-talks-after -5-years-with-balance/print 
86 See, e.g., Sell, supra note 40, at 450; Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
456, 515–22 (2009) (describing the Development Agenda’s evolution into an “agenda on pro development reform of 
the international intellectual Property system”).  For more cautious assessments see Ruth Okediji, “History Lessons 
for the WIPO Development Agenda”, in Netanel (2009): 137-161; and Keith Maskus, “The WIPO Development 
Agenda: A Cautionary Note”, in Netanel (2009): 163-174.  
87 Laurence Helfer & Karen Alter, The Influence of the Andean Intellectual Property Regime on Access to Medicines 
in Latin America, in BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH; GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE BATTLE OVER 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN AMERICA (Rochelle Dreyfuss & Cesar Rodriguez-
Garavito eds., 2013).  
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that Andean governments required the adoption of TRIPs flexibilities in implementation. The 
Andean Tribunal has been able to combat TRIPS-Plus provisions by enforcing bans on pipeline 
patents, second-use patents, and placing limits on data exclusivity.88 
The development of a rival economic and social rights frame, most importantly, is reflected 
at the national level in the growth of new transnational constitutional law movements.89 Although 
there is a small body of literature on the role of constitutionalism in international law,90 it is this 
bottom-up transnational constitutional movement that is the key development, representing a 
sweep of judicialization and rights adjudication around the world.91 This movement diffuses 
constitutional law norms across national jurisdictions that can be used to interpret international 
law commitments, such as those under the TRIPS Agreement and the ICESCR. As a joint report 
of the WHO, WIPO and the WTO notes, “[b]y 2009, 135 countries had incorporated aspects of 
the right to health in their national constitutions.”92  
Brazil, India, and South Africa have enjoyed some notable success in implementing 
provisions facilitating access to medicines and the use of TRIPs flexibilities. They all successfully 
have warded off legal challenges from originator drug firms and their government sponsors.93 
India, for example, defended itself against the Swiss pharmaceutical firm Novartis’ challenge to 
India’s right to implement flexibilities to prevent evergreening.94 In April 2013 The Indian 
Supreme Court upheld the Indian Patent Office’s decision to deny Novartis a patent on its drug 
Gleevec.95 India and Brazil also lodged complaints at the WTO against the European Union and 
the Netherlands, in May 2010, for seizing generic drugs in transit. In its complaint, India invoked 
relevant TRIPs provisions as well as the Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
88 Helfer and Alter.  
89 See, e.g., VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2009); Tom Ginsburg, 
Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707 
(2006).  
90 JEFFREY L. DUNOFF & JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2009); JAN KLABBERS ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2009). 
91 See Hirschl, The Judicialization of Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 126–27 (Keith E. 
Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A. Caldeira eds., 2008); Tom Ginsburg & Mila Veerstteg, The Global 
Spread of Constitutional Review: An Empirical Assessment, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 
(forthcoming 2014). As Ginsburg and Veersteeg write, “[b]y our account, some 38% of all constitutional systems had 
constitutional review in 1951; by 2011, 72% of the world’s constitutions gave courts the power to supervise 
implementation of the constitution and set aside legislation for incompatibility . . . Arguably, this trend is one of the 
most important phenomena in late 20th and early 21st century government.” Id. For a political science analysis of 
diffusion from below see, Ann Towns, Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding International Policy Diffusion 
“From Below”, INT’L ORG., Vol. 66, No. 2, 179–209 (2012). 
92 PROMOTING ACCESS, supra note 71, at 40.; 
93 See, e.g., HELFER & AUSTIN, supra note 15; Smita Narula, The Rights-Based Approach to Intellectual Property 
and Access to Medicines: Parameters and Pitfalls (N.Y.U. Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Working 
Paper No. 299, 2011), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/299. 
94 See, e.g., Sandeep Rathod, Evergreening: A Status Check in Selected Countries, 7 J. Generic Medicines 227 
(2010) 
95 After a seven year legal battle, the Indian Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Indian Patent Office to refuse to 
grant a patent on the Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis’ Gleevec. Under Indian patent law, section 3(d) 
requires that patents only be granted on new and innovative compounds that have demonstrated increased 
therapeutic efficacy. This law aims to curtail the pharmaceutical firms’ practice of evergreening. See Ellen ‘t Hoen, 




                                                 
and Article 12(1) of the ICESCR, “which recognizes the right of all persons to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”96 India and Brazil obtained a 
favorable settlement as a result.97  
Smaller countries such as Ecuador also have been champions of promoting access to health. 
For example, a coalition of local generic drug producers, social, environmental and indigenous 
organizations enjoyed the strong support of Ecuador’s President Correa who rejected a proposed 
U.S.-Ecuador FTA. In doing so, they framed intellectual property rights as “an urgent health 
issue.”98  
 Around the world, national courts have become bolder in overseeing human rights 
protections, including economic and social rights, such as the right to health. National courts in 
Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, South Africa, Kenya, and 
Venezuela have recognized HIV/AIDS patients’ rights to access to medicines.99 As Laurence 
Helfer points out, “a 2006 study identified seventy-one cases from twelve countries invoking a 
right of access to medicines, with a success rate of 83 percent.”100 This national move in 
developing countries of incorporating a human rights frame can also contribute, and in a number 
of countries already has contributed, to interpreting and shaping the definition of IP rights at the 
national level.  
 
V. STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The development of a rival human rights transnational legal order has created pressure to 
shape patent law in developing countries for social ends. Toward this end, developing countries 
can adopt pragmatic strategies to shape and tailor IP legal norms and practices. This chapter 
concludes by raising five complementary strategies, two concerning substantive matters and three 
institutional ones.101 
 
A. Substantive strategies  
96 Lisa Forman, An Elementary Consideration of Humanity? Linking Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights to 
the Human Right to Health in International Law, J. WORLD INTELL. PROP., Vol. 14, No. 2, 168 (2011) (quoting 
Indian complaint). 
97 Whether the settlement goes far enough is still a matter of debate.  See Brook K. Baker, Settlement of India/EU 
WTO Dispute re Seizures of In-Transit Medicines: Why the Proposed EU Border Regulation Isn't Good Enough 
(Am. Univ. Washington Coll. Law, PIJIP Research Paper no. 2012-02, Dec. 2012), available at 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/24/. 
98 Antoni Verger & Barbara van Paassen, Human Development vis-à-vis Free Trade: Understanding Developing 
Countries’ Positions in Trade Negotiations on Education and Intellectual Property Rights, 2012 REV. OF INT’L POL. 
ECON. 22. 
99 Helfer, Pharmaceutical Patents, supra note 15.; Patricia Asero Ochieng et. al., Petition No. 409 of 2009, 
Judgment, High Court of Kenya, April 20, 2012, http://www.aidslawproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/04/Judgment-Petition-No-409-of-2009-Anti-counterfeit -case.pdf  The Kenyan High Court 
struck down a U.S.-sponsored anti-counterfeiting law. The Court cited the right to health and determined that the 
law would have curbed access to generic medicines.  
100 Id.  
101 These strategies complement those proposed by others for the implementation of intellectual property regimes 
within developing countries, such as Professor Carlos Correa, Rochelle Dreyfuss, César Rodriquez-Garavito, and 
Amy Kapczynski. See, e.g., Frederick Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address Public Health 
Crises: Responding to USTR-State-Industry Positions that Undermine the WTO, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (Daniel Kennedy & James Southwick eds., 2002); CARLOS CORREA, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS (2000).  
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A number of developing countries and their stakeholders have adopted two complementary 
strategies to shape IP norms. On the one hand, they have participated in the development of a rival 
TLO that can affect the interpretation and application of IP law, that of economic and social rights. 
On the other hand, they may apply long-established U.S. and EU exceptions to IP protections in 
new ways to address broader social goals, strategically building from the foreign to meet local 
needs.  
  
1. Developing alternative normative frames for the interpretation of international IP 
norms. 
As John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos contend in their book Global Business Regulation, 
less powerful stakeholders in global debates fare better if they invest resources in developing 
principle-based normative frames. These frames can then be combined with technical expertise to 
apply them. Otherwise, such expertise will tend to work within normative frames created by 
powerful actors, such as the U.S. and EU, and diffused through technical assistance programs, 
whether through WIPO, WTO, bilateral or private sector programs. The U.S., for example, 
arguably has the strongest protections of free speech in the world under the First Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution, which it does not compromise in applying policies in overlapping policy 
domains. Developing countries can do the same using the normative frames of human rights, 
consumer protection, access to medicines, and access to knowledge in applying IP law. As is 
already evident in the right to health context, these frames can be transnationalized through the 
support of allied civil society groups and international institutions, furthering the development of 
a rival TLO that can be used for local ends.  
 
2. Citing U.S. and EU precedents while transforming them for national purposes.  
As the French child psychologist Jean Piaget writes, “to comprehend is to invent.”102 
Developing countries are required to implement international IP law that they have signed and 
ratified, which sets forth particular concepts, standards and rules. They can do so, however, in light 
of their development needs by inventing while implementing, by adapting while adopting. The 
U.S. and EU legal systems for IP include exceptions which reflect U.S. and EU social goals. 
Developing countries can strategically cite these exceptions conceptually, but apply them in new 
ways, thereby building from the foreign in a manner that advances the local. In this way, 
developing countries can help to foil U.S. and EU pressures by noting that they are applying 
exceptions recognized in U.S. and EU law itself, and applied by their courts,103 even if U.S. and 
EU courts in practice would apply the exceptions differently. For example, Indian courts have 
limited the granting of injunctive relief to curtail access to generic medicines, creatively citing 
U.S. jurisprudence for support.  In a 2008 case, Roche v. Cipla, the Indian court determined that it 
would apply the normal Indian standards for granting a preliminary injunction, which are more 
limited than the standards demanded by IP rights holders. Interestingly, the Indian court creatively 
cited a US case, eBay v. MercExchange, and a non-precedential U.S. Federal Circuit decision that 
noted public health concerns, to affirm the denial of an injunction in a case involving a drug-eluting 
102 See JEAN PIAGET, OÙ VA L'ÉDUCATION? COMPRENDRE, C'EST INVENTER (1973). Roberto Unger appears to have 
adapted this concept slightly while attributing it to Piaget. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY 
REALIZED 96 (2000) (“To imitate, wrote Piaget, is to invent.”). 
103 Jerome Reichman, “Intellectual Property in  the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or 
Follow?” HOUST L. REV. 46(4): 1115-1185 (2009). 
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stent.104  The Indian court concluded that harm to third parties would be irreparable and denied a 
preliminary injunction, even though it appears that U.S. courts would have regularly granted it 
under U.S. case law.105 
 Additional opportunities may exist for using U.S. precedents and practices in the area of 
antitrust/competition law that have sought to balance protecting innovation while trying to 
constrain health care costs. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has fined brand name 
companies that pursue strategies of product launches that “‘serve no purpose other than to 
undermine the ability of a generic to compete.’”106 The FTC is more likely to pursue a case in 
which the plaintiff can demonstrate: “(1) reduced consumer choice; (2) additional conduct aimed 
at preventing generic substitution, and (3) little or no demonstrable medical benefit from 
substitution.”107 Such strategies could support efforts to prevent evergreening and other market 
manipulations to stave off generic competition. While hardly a panacea, adopting and 
implementing strong competition laws to reduce IP-related abuses of monopoly positions is a 
strategy that has been advocated and implemented in a number of countries, such as South 
Africa.108 
 
B. Institutional strategies  
Institutional strategies complement substantive ones. Developing countries have 
implemented a number of institutional strategies to advance their positions and thwart pressure on 
them. They have invested in developing local technical expertise that can build links regionally 
and transnationally.  
 
1. Developing Local Expertise. 
Developing countries need to develop not only normative frames for addressing the trade-
human rights-IP nexus; they also need technical expertise to apply it. In this way, they become 
entrepreneurs and not simply adapters of U.S. and EU legal norms that are institutionalized through 
international law and technical assistance implementation programs. This local IP expertise will 
need to be broad-based, embedded within government institutions, and include representatives of 
generic producers of pharmaceuticals, academics, and civil society.109 In this way, developing 
104 EBAY INC. ET. AL. V. MERCEXCHANGE L.L.C. NO. 05-130 2005 available at: 
www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-130.pdf 
105 Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s 
Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571, 1607 n. 212 (2009) (citing F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla 
Ltd. (2008) 642 I.A., available at http://www.i-
mak.org/storage/F%20Hoffmann%20La%20Roche%20v%20Cipla%20Ltd%202008.pdf).  
106 Seth Silber & Kara Kuritz, Product Switching in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Ripe for Antitrust Scrutiny? J. 
GENERIC MEDICINES, Vol. 7, No. 2, 129 (2010) (quoting FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz). 
107 Id. at 127. 
108 See Carsten Fink, Comment I: Competition Law as a means of Containing Intellectual Property Rights, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REGIME 772 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005); Heinz Klug, Access to Medicines and the 
Transformation of the South African State, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (Gregory 
Shaffer, ed. 2013). 
109 Brazil has built considerable expertise, for example, in WTO law. See Gregory Shaffer, The Trials of Winning at 
the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383 (2008).  See also BATTLING WEALTH AND 
HEALTH: GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES IN LATIN AMERICA (Rochelle Dreyfuss & César Rodriquez-Garavito eds., forthcoming) (focusing on this 
need and examples within the Latin American context); GREGORY SHAFFER & JAMES NEDUMPARA, INDIA AND THE 
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countries can better institutionalize alternative frames for addressing the IP- trade-human rights 
nexus at the national level. 
Governments need to create strong institutions with professional expertise. Patent offices, 
for example, must make critical determinations in approving patents, as must courts in reviewing 
challenges to them. Peter Drahos has written extensively about the development of expertise in 
developing country patent offices in order for them to make independent decisions and not simply 
follow analyses made in the U.S. and European Patent Office (EPO).110 The Indian legal system, 
as well as a number of Latin American systems, for example, provides for important substantive 
and procedural innovations,111 but these provisions will only have meaning if institutions apply 
them in practice. Institutions are most likely to implement them in practice if they are pressed to 
do so by legal advocates working with the generic pharmaceutical sector and civil society, 
supported by academics.112 
 
2. Pooling resources.  
One way that expertise can be built and diffused is by pooling resources through regional, 
transnational, and international alliances specializing in trade-related intellectual property 
issues.113 The Andean Pact provides an example of how such expertise can be institutionalized.114 
Regional centers can provide a forum for the sharing of experiences and the identification of best 
practices. These centers can work with academics, or be tied to academic institutions. UNCTAD’s 
development-oriented initiatives can serve as a node in this network.115 However, regional 
institutions can be captured if they are not developed in a bottom-up manner, as Carolyn Deere 
demonstrates in her study of the French West African organization for intellectual property, OAPI 
(Organisation Africaine de la Propriété Intellectuelle).116 Thus, broad-based initiatives that include 
health activists and generic pharmaceutical producers are, once more, central. 
3. Coordinating with Allies in Industrialized Countries.  
Finally, developing countries will need to continue to, coordinate with private parties and 
government authorities in the United States and Europe to undercut industry pressure in the 
formation of U.S. and EU negotiating positions and strategies. International negotiations involve 
a two-level game in which national constituencies compete in the formation of national positions 
WTO (2013). 
110 See, e.g., Peter Drahos, “Trust Me”: Patent Offices in Developing Countries, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 151 (2008).  
111 See, e.g., Paola Bergallo & Agustina Ramón Michel, The Recursively of Global Lawmaking in the Fight for an 
Argentine Policy on Drug Patents, in BATTLING WEALTH AND HEALTH, supra note 97; Kapczynski, supra note 93, 
at 1571 (addressing Indian innovations in (1) the substantive evaluation of patents in terms of what constitutes 
novelty; (2) the substantive evaluation of patents in terms of what constitutes an inventive step; (3) the inclusion of 
broad standing rights to challenge a patent before it is issued through an administrative process; (4) limits on the 
grant of injunctive relief in favor of rights holders; and (5) the enhancement of rights to challenge patents under 
competition law).  
112 BATTLING WEALTH AND HEALTH, supra note 97.  
113 See also Peter Drahos, When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization, 8 
INT’L NEGOTIATION 79 (2003). 
114 Laurence R. Helfer et al., Islands of Effective International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property 
Rule of Law in the Andean Community, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2009). 
115 DEERE, supra note 19, at 137–40. 
116 Id.  
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and those national positions are then advanced in international negotiations.117 Developing 
countries can work with U.S. and European political allies to alter the U.S. and European domestic 
political calculus. If developing countries cannot neutralize the clout of large pharmaceutical firms 
in the formation of U.S. and European positions, then developing countries will face the full brunt 
of U.S. and European pressure in the negotiation and enforcement of pharmaceutical patent rights.  
In a world of asymmetric power, developing countries enhance the prospects of their 
success if other U.S. and European constituencies offset the pharmaceutical industry’s pressure on 
U.S. and European trade authorities to aggressively advance industry interests. Domestic and 
international non-governmental advocates, such as ACT UP, Doctors Without Borders, and 
Oxfam, have, directly and indirectly, been allies. They raise fundamental moral issues that are 
picked up in the media and that help to hold U.S. and EU political leaders accountable. They also 
harness the public’s self-interest over the cost of prescription drugs and public officials’ struggles 
to finance health care commitments within the United States and Europe themselves, potentially 
“destabilizing the consensus that U.S. business elites had built around TRIPS.”118  
This strategy has worked in a number of cases. The United States backed off from 
challenging South Africa’s and Brazil’s patent laws primarily in the context of U.S. domestic 
political pressures. AIDS activists gathered at Vice President Gore’s presidential campaign stops 
holding placards for the nightly news and chanting “Gore’s greed kills” to press the administration 
to change its policy on South Africa.119 The Bush administration withdrew the United States’ claim 
against Brazil’s compulsory licensing provisions under Brazil’s patent law following similar 
protests.120 United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick again deflected U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry pressures in agreeing to the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health at Doha.121 U.S. negotiators were similarly pressed by a Democratic Congress to 
alter its negotiating positions in the FTAs with Columbia and Panama, ultimately concluded in 
2011, to retain more flexibility for providing access to medicines.122 In short, when TRIPS issues 
become politicized domestically within the United States and Europe, developing countries retain 
greater leeway to develop intellectual property policies to fit their own needs. 
117 See, e.g., DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Peter B. Evans, 
Harold K. Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam eds., 1993); Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic 
of Two-level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988). For an application to the US and EU contexts regarding trade, see 
GREGORY SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003). 
118 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 576 (2001). 
119 See Doug Ireland, AIDS Drugs for Africa, NATION, Oct. 4, 1999, at 5; Steven Meyers, South Africa and U.S. End 
Dispute Over Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999, at A8. Vice-President Gore was co-chairman of the U.S.-South 
Africa Bi-National Commission on pharmaceutical issues. 
120 See, e.g., U.S., Brazil End WTO Case on Patents, Split on Bilateral Process, 19 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1, 2 (2001). 
Doctors Without Borders and Oxfam launched campaigns in the United States and Europe against US policies. See, 
e.g., Drug Companies vs. Brazil: The Threat to Public Health, OXFAM (May 1, 2001), available at http://policy-
practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/drug-companies-vs-brazil-the-threat-to-public-health-114469. 
121 See also Gary Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, Agreement on TRIPS/Public Health Reached at WTO Ministerial in 
Doha, 18 INT’L TRADE REP. 1817 (2001). 
122 U.S. TPP Environment Proposal Follows 'May 10,' But May Have Different Effects, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 18, 
2011 (“The May 10 deal was negotiated between House Democrats and the Bush administration and strengthened 
labor rights and environmental protections in trade deals with Colombia, Panama and Peru, while also offering these 
countries additional flexibilities in the area of intellectual property rights in order to promote access to medicines.”).  
Jamie Love at Knowledge Ecology International in the U.S., for example, has been relentless in the struggle for 
access to medicines and knowledge both domestically and transnationally.  See, e.g., James Love, Director, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, http://keionline.org/jamie (last visited Mar. 16, 2013) (including a biography 
and selected publications of James Love). 
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CONCLUSION 
The construction of transnational legal orders provides normative ordering that addresses 
issues perceived to be problems that are transnational in scope. It thereby constrains and facilitates 
domestic law and practice. Developing countries can benefit from transnational legal ordering, but 
such ordering also can reflect the particular interests of powerful countries and constituencies 
within them. As regards the transnational legal ordering of trade and IP, constituencies within 
developing countries increasingly demand that their countries retain the flexibility to implement 
IP protection in a manner that respects human rights and development concerns.  
Paradoxically, these countries profit from, and are also constrained by, a rival legal order 
that is also transnational in scope — that of the economic and social right to health. On the one 
hand, a number of developing countries have adopted strategies to deploy this rival TLO to 
advance their goals. Countries such as India and Brazil, for example, have attempted to adapt 
patent law in innovative ways, in part to meet the demands of constituencies within them to further 
a human right to health care. On the other hand, such constituencies have pressed the government 
to provide health services on human rights grounds that the government otherwise would have 
foregone, whether because of budgetary priorities or otherwise. Today, national law is made in 
transnational context, and national policies are being adapted accordingly. To understand and 
participate effectively in legal processes, one increasingly needs to think transnationally. 
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